The proble m the In ternet poses (o r law is not simply whet he r the Inte rnet can be regulated. but more theoretically, what are the consequences if it cannot? In a n anempl 10 answer this question, Ihis paper will apply nco-classical economic theory to governments as if they were mo nopolies and ex plore the consequences once the ir mo nopoly positions arc destroyed (because of the inability to regulate information now).1 Specifically, this paper will consider the theory of Mo nroe E. Price,2 known as th e "market fo r loyalties" theory, which has been previou sly applied by him in the context of internationa l broadcasting regulation. Afte r ex plainin g the theory and its initial applicalion by Professor Pri ce, the paper will illustrate how the " marke t for loyal ties " theory may be ex tended. Th e e xt ension will be performed by considering elasticity to permit pred ict io ns of the Internet's impact on authoritarian governments that fail to regulate the Inte rn et. even while reducing such analysis to a mathematical funct ion. Interestingly. those regimes that historically restrict informa tion now the most are susceptible to the greatest instability as a result of new info rmation technologies such as the l nternet. The appropria tc ness of the nco-classical theory in light of the problem of externalit ics and collective action is also reviewed. This paper's analysis of the conseq uences of the loss of monopoly con trol over info rnlation now as a result of the In ternet. and the e ffect of market elasticity upo n those consequences. is new a Dd has Dot been previo usly considered by Professor Price (whose work instead focuses on the regulation of broadcasti ng).'
CAN THE INTERNET BE REGULATED?
The object of this paper is to explore the effect of loss of monopoly control by governments and power elites over information now as a result of the Internel. However, that question assumes that there is a loss ?f mo?opoly control (i.e., that governments find it difficult, if not Impossible. to regulate the Jnternet).
The issue in quest ion is information blockage. More specifically. the issue of regulation is limited to whether (i) content on the Internet can be controlJed a nd (ii) access to that content can be rest ricted. The issue is not whether the behavior of specific in~ividuals on the Web may be monitored, disciplined, censored or otherwIse controlled, but whether there is significantly increased information flow to a society at large. whkh cannO! be blocked by its government. Consequently, discussion of Internet regulation will not generally dwell on privacy (e.g .. the U.S. Carnivore data surveillance system, emp loyee e-mail monitoring or the European Union Directive o.n Data Protection)/ copyright infringement. or computer security , but simply on whe the r, In terms of content, the flow of infomlation can be effectively controlled. Consideration will be given to arguments on both sides of the issue regarding th e ability to regulate the Internet.
A. Wily If May NOf Be Possible to Regulate fhe Intemef
The Internet. by its very nature, is difficult to regulate. Originally developed by the United States Departmen t of Defense to maintain comm unica tions between critical agencies in times of war, the Internet was designed with sufficient flexibility to coun ter even the most determined blocking effort's. It has thus become an axiom among Internet users that " the Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around ie .,!
The difriculty of regulating such information flow quickly becomes apparent. Even when an Internet service provider (" ISP") bans a site, usually as a result of threatened government action (which often results in banning a large number of sites that are not objectionable), the lypical response from the Internet community is the "crea tion of ;mirror sites' in unrestricted areas of the [ntern e t. .,~ Particularly problematic is the lack HA~v. INT 1_ U . 207. 217-11-1 (1997 
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of geographic location (a prereqUISite for legal jurisdiction and enforcement) of information on the Net.
IT}he determined seeker of prohibited communications can si mply reconfigure her or his connection to appear to reside in a different location. ou tside th e particular locality. state or country. Because the Net is enginee red to work on the basis of " Iogical " not geographic loca tions, any attempt to defeat the independence of messages (rom physical locations would be as futile as an effort to tie an a tom and a bit together. 1 1n many respects, the resistance of the Interne t to regulation is based on the nature of information itself: fluid, leaky. replicable, intangible, ex~andable, compressible, transportable, omnipresent, and shareable, etc. Such qualities are alien to traditional lega l and economic models, making regulation difficule 9 While there arc Internet " realists." such as Jack L Goldsm.ith, who downplay the differences of cyber and --real" space,lU even Professor Goldsmith acknowledges: "ITlhe enforceable scope [of lawJ is relative ly narrow. It extends only to individual users or system operators with presences and assets in the enforcement juriSdiction .... ,,11 Other cyber law ex perts are much more skeptical of the ability to regulate the Pro-Ismel IVr.b Silt' us tlte Mideusl Conflict E.rpul/lb ',riO C,.bcrspao looked hard instead at whnt mnkes it so ~pecial. hi. 11128. Although HIlrin CleveJand nnd this atuhor may differ in opinion ~s 10 Ihe viabilit)' of economic anAlysis in the informmlon nse. the nature of informalion is funda mcntullv different (rom lhe t.raditional kind of thinking olldrcssed by economie models and I~gal systems. ·In f~et. for one theoriSt. informat ion is nOI so much a Ihing M it is II "physical properly of Ihe universe liS ' rcar as ari: matter and encrgy.-Stonier. sO/pm note I. al 54. Thinking about infonnation and th e Internct in Ihes.: tcnns may have profound impliealiolU on our legHl uml eoonomic syslCUlfi.
Harke, D .. fares
10. Set' Jack L Goldsmith. Another critical aspect of the problem is the volume o( inte rne t traffic and use, which makes e (fective m()nitoring difficu lt. if not impossible:
Jndivi~u a l e~ectrons can easily, and without any realistic prospeel of detec tl o~. "cnter" any sovere ign's territory. Th e volume of el ecl ro~1l c COIl1~lUnications crossing territorial boundaries is just 100 g real .I~ relalJol] .to the. resou rces ava ilable to government authOrities to permlt meanmgful control. U.S. CuslOms officials have generally give n up.rt True. there is the FBI's Carnivore digi tal su rve illance sys tem and the open so urce a lternative Altivore,l~ but these sys tems arc only capable of targeting specific individuals via a specific medium such as e-mail or on lin e shopping. T he syste m will not work to monilor Net traffic on any significam sca ie. 16 . C~nt emplating t.he sheer size of the Inte rne t is aki n to grasping the thmc nslons of the uDlverse. A recent study by the School of Information Manage ment Study al the University of California at Berkeley tried to est imat e the Web's size:
Ln 2000 the ~o rld Wide We b consisted of about 21 terabytes {lOr~ bytes] o f static HTML p<lges, and is growing at a rate of 100% per yca r. Many Web pages are generated on-the-tly fr o m data in RI,v. 1095 RI,v. (1996 : Jocl R.
Rcrd(nberg. GOI/(JrnltlgN~" 'Q'ks ,,,ul Ru/c'lIIflkmg; " Cybt:rspu<; /!. 45 EMORY W . 91 [ (1996). 13. C/IOOS PI1!I'UUmg.iupru note 12.011086n.64.
14. 10hll!lon & Posl.$IIpm nOI~ 7. HI g. 15. MfJ 'Yhrck 8D.f· SigIJu/s RIP P""'lIey Swre. NewswlRE (VNU) . Feb. 7, 2001 . lI""ih,bI~ UI 2001 WL ~307451 (nlso reports on rumor of syslem buill by ()rili,;h intelligcn~). 
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T he same study also stated tha t the re wo uld be an estimated fOllr billion individual Web pages by 2001.
IM
In response \0 concerns about the undesirable e(fects of the Internet, whethe r perceived or actual. Singapore fashioned an " Int ernet Code of Practice" in 1996: 9 designed to hold ISPs accountable for providing access to objectionable materials.
However. Singapore recognizes the impossibility of IOtally blocking undesirable material. One legal scholar commented on this fact. noting lhe ro le of a "best endeavors" standard for ISPs in Singapore:
Although the implication of the "best endeavors" proviso li.e .. (SPs are requ ired to exert "best endeavors" in screening objectionable materialJ is not immediately clear, the special circumstances of th e Lnteme t. the rapidity of communications and the difficulty of harnessing the continuous flow (or regulatory purposes. may be taken into accoun t in determining whether a licensee was or was not in breach of [the Internet Code of PracticeJ. Moreove r, conSidering tha t cyberspace is increasingly proving ungovernable even by the standards of the best "cybercops" imaginable, the degree of allowances for failure envisaged by the Code may indeed be wider lhan might appear. Compared with the best alte rnative of shutting out any " unwant ed information" through a total blackout (th e very notion of whic h the government has repea tedly come out against). the requirement of "best efforts" in a reality which is characterized by dynamism and unpredictability and, therefore, enormo usly beyond control might be construed as pe rmission to continue business as " normal " or "slightly less than normal. ""Z\l By adopting this " best endeavors" standard , Singapore acknowledges the impossibility of completely screening information now over the Internet. The question is how significantly will Singapore ':s " Interne t Code of Practice" impede information Oow, that is, whe th er it will consti tut e anything morc than a "speed bwnp on the information rughway." ll As a final dimension to tbe problem, the government's interest in participating in the global economy and using the Inte rne t as a viable tool is counterbalanced by th e governme nt's desire to block information . The Chinese government faces this dile mma and has addressed the " volume proble m" by restricting access:
This fact Ii.e., the Internet is too large to monitorj is confirmed by the Chinese government 's own eITorts to limit access to a manageable number of users, wh.ich include limiting access to certain professions and keeping the cost of local Internet service artificially high. Such efforts are also counter prOductive, beca use 1'0 the cxtem they succeed and access to the In ternet is limited , an y economic development attributable 10 the Internet IS correspondingly minimized. The government's other control mechanism, "firewall" software which blocks access to obj ectionable areas of the Internet, is simila rl y flaw ed The conflict is once again clear: to the extent that such outside contacts are numerOus enough to spur economic development, they compromise the security of the ne twork and prevent effective monitoring To prevent infiltration of its network by determined ind ividual users, China would have to sever contact with tbe Internet comple tely. 1t remains to be seen whether tbe desire to re tain social control would induce the Chinese government 10 take such a step.n 2(l. Ende~huw,~llfl'll nOle t9. :11 220-2 1. Dr. Endeshaw goes on to note. hoWt:ver. thaI in spite of Ihe "be$l endeavors" proviso. u ther portions of the ~C1 crea t. 
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On November 7, 2000, China's Ministry of Informati on Industry issued regulations governing "information-release services. ,,~l In addition to established firewall lechniques, th e regulations requ ire lSPs to apply [or pe rmission to post news infomlalion with respect to preapproved, regist ered categories.!· The Chinese governme nt prohibits Chinese Web si tes from reporting news in general.2:' I i n addition , ISPs must remOve and report any prohibited mate rial immedialely,' lO as we ll as keep records of LP addresses and domain names of "information dissem inators ... 27 Prohibited informa tion includes. among oth er things, information containing content " impairing the image and interests of the nation," "subve rting state power," " unde rmining the state's policies on religion and advocating cults and feudal superstitions." a nd "d isrupting social order and jeopardizing social sta bility ... :,1. ! 1 In the past. China has been reluctant to crack down too harshly on its citizens for fear that "surfers might flee to Chinese-language sites overseas. "2'/ Although the authoriti es now block many such sites, Chinese su rfe rs arc adept at using " proxy servers to get around the firewall. "
Tn essence, the question for restrictive governments is how to limjt access to th e Interne l, while at the same time taking advantage of the Internet's economic benefits. Conseque ntly , most governments may not be wi lling to comple tely seve r access to the Inte rn et. instead o pting to find the proper balance between restricLing access to th e " undesirable" while using th e lmernel as a tool for development.)\ Essentially. such ; "recompulcr!; lha l muy reque~4i for a u.~~r op" raling on hi, Or her O"' n Pc. Onty Ihe prox)' ~e""er kn<)w$ the [n ternet address of the compmer on which the user origin"tcs hi!; or he r requesl. Becrlusc th~ pro~y scrv<' !r can launch ~ search Or r<'!quest. hy using pf!)~y serv<'!r.;, Int<lnlct users can of len effectively disgui5e who they arc.
31. The lnl~rnet is a faClor in globaliuHion and coonomie developmcnl_ The gcn~rllJ imporlancc o f globali7Juion and economies of inclusion ..... as nmed in a rectnl T<lp<lr! from the Worl(j BII11k: "Although globaliUl tiotl has crea ted problems, it ha~ 111 ... 0 been the engine of r~markabl e POV<lrty reduclion among 3 billion people of the new globali7.i ng countries." WORLO SA/III{. GLOIJAl.l1.AT!ON GROwnl, AND I'OVSRTV: BUtWINO AN INCLUSIVE W ORW Et".oNOMY J46 (2002) . (''hina is authoritarian governments may suffer (rom the delusion of "having their cake and eating it too." in summary. the ability of the Internet to route around blockages. the phenomenon of mirror sites. the sheer volume of the Net, and the desire of na tions 10 take adva ntage of the Internet's potential as a 1001 for economic growt h and delivery of vital scientific. economic and educa tional in formatio n render the In ternet resistant to, and in some instances effectively immune from regulation.
Argumellfs to the Comrary
I. Borde"~' ill Cyberspace
In spite of Ihe evidence suggesting the impossibility of regulating lhe Internet. some cyber law scholars are making arguments to the contrary. Chiefly, despite assert ions otherwise,'l there are some recognizable borders in cyberspace. the existe nce of which implies the possibi lity of regulation.
The The response from the Internet community, however, was markedly different from the obscenity incident America Online and Compuservc initially declined to comply.~~ Furthermore. a grassroots effor! by Internet users crea ted mu ltiple ave nues of access a round the blockage. O~"rlltnr:; C(}mpuSe"'e Germo"y Pomogmpl,y lA]nti-censo rship advocates at several United Slates unjve rsities engaged in effort s to thwa rt the restrictive actions of T-Online, including the creation of " mirror sit es" in unrestricted areas of the Internet. These sites, which we re essentia lly mult iples of sites containing objectionable material, re ndered T -On lin e's blocking efforts much less e ffective if no t complete ly ineffe ctive .~l Perhaps the most importan t Inte rne t case to dale in volved Ya hoo! (the largestlnternc t portal in the United SL ales, with 237 million users)'" and the online sale of Nazi me morabilia in violation of Fre nch law. T he dispute resulted in litigation in both France a nd the Uni ted States, with courts in the two count ries producing con nicting res ult s. ~~ The judge in the French case orde red a team of experts to find ways to block French users from accessing Yahoo 's o nline auction site, due to the si te containing Nazi memorabilia .... Yahoo! expe rts testified that it was not possible to effectively filt e r access to its auction site."
Cmm
" It is a comple te illusio n to think you ca n seal off access to a site on a country basis," said Jean · De ni s Gorin , techn ical director of a French l.nternet company, Edelwe b, who ha s appeared as an expert witness for Yahoo!. "By ide nl ifyin g a surfe r's coun try of origin , you can of course deny access to him , but the re are many ways of gel1in g round the ban," Gorin said.-C8 from Gennany to another European OOUnlr')' rather Ih&n cump ly with Ihe law [Ge rman I nternet legislation} it says would force 11 "cil of censorship ovcr a large part of the InterneL "). At a subsequent hea ring, the French co urt's own appointed experts testifi ed that a " total prohibition would be impossible. ,,49 The French court subseque ntly found that si nce Yahoo! was technically able to take measures to screen some Fre nch citizens [rom illegal sites, it was required to do so, and the court ordered Yahoo! to implement a " keyword·based filt ering system" in nine ty days or face fin es of approximately $13,000 per day .~ In November 2001, Yahoo! was victorious in a summary judgme nt action in the U.S. federal district court in San Jose. Cal ifornia, whe re the issue was the validity of the French order in the U . S .~I The District Court held, " the principal of comity is
43
The filte r can also be thwa rted by u$ing one of the increa~ing numbers of websiles which act as a relay statioll for surfers. pr()\liding them with tOial anonymilY. Anoth er possibility is to de ny aceess on the basis of language used by the u$Cr's browse r. placi ng a block. According to their report. oompute r seIVers automalically register the nationality of70 pen;ent of French surfers when they log on. These USCrl could easi ly be denied a = to the sites.
But for the other 30 perce nt, effective screening would rely on their yoluntarily submitting their nationality. a condi tion which could never be fully enforced ....
The experts also CQrI'lidcred that 1\ monitoring medlanism rOt"" keywords tha t would trigger 1\ cu t-out rpresumably, an automatie response or warni ngl when typed would also prove unworkable. ~use surfers would qu ick ly lind ways to circumvenl iL Wre nn . associa te general counS£'l lIItern 3lional ror Yuhoo!. told US reporters t hat: 'what wc're asking a judge to do is to loolc M the order from Frnncc and determine whether it is valid here in the U.S:~ ou tweighed by the Cou rt's obligation to uphold the First Amendmcnt ,',$l Whe n filing th e action, " Yahoo! attorney Gregg Wrenn said ... that Yahoo! wou ld ignore the [French] ruling and refuse to pay the fines unless a U.S. court enforced it. "~ In addition to Yabool 's effort s, th e European ISP Association has asked the European Commission to review the matter as a pote ntial violation of EU l aw.~ Even prior to th e ruling in the U.S. district court.~ some experts questioned whether the decision in the French coun cou ld be enfo rced since Yahoo! apparently opera tes, for the most part, outside France.
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One expert predicts, "companies are going to ensure that (hey have no asse ts in Europe to red uce the chances of being successfully sued."~7
The French cou rt 's decision , however, may have had some chill ing effect. While Yahoo! cofounder and CEO , Je rry Yang, mainlaiJled prior to both Ihe ruling of the U.S. federal district court and the French court 's rulings Ihat Yahool would not change content on its site.jIj Yahoo! announced on January 3, ZeN}1 that, "as a business decision," it wou ld scree n its auction si le fo r Nazi ilems.~~ Non etheless, even with Yahoo! 's cooperation, only an estimat ed seventy perce nt of French users can be screened.
tol According to Yahoo! , th e accuracy of the filt e ring technology is also eSl imaled 10 be very low when measured by the rate of permissible sites needlessly screened OUt. 
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servers and identify all Ihe refere nces to Nazism. Then someo ne will have to create a separate index of the pro-Nazi materials, while allowing the anti-Nazi stuff to pass. No indexing program yet devised can manage this, ... just go to Yahoo and run a search under "Nazi.'· You'U see a link to U.S. governme nt archives of Nazi documents, fo r use by scholars.6. 1 73 Furthermore. exist ing services on the Web like Anonymizer and SafeWeb work to conceal user IP addresses which can be used 10 pinpoint user 10cation. 0J In addition, services like AOL do not use rp addresses but instead use separate networks.t >4 In sum, Yahoo!'s victory in the U.S. federal district courl in San Josel6 opens the Fre nch court's order to legitimate questions regarding its effective ness and enforceability.
In addition to independent attempts to regulate (he Interne( on a national basis, such as in Germany and France, the European Union has issue d three Direct ives add ressi ng the issue of liability of ISPs and Ih e right of consumers \0. sue foreign supplie rs .of go~ds and services ~w h e re such goods and services have bee n supplted via the Internet) . The threat of liabi lit y, whethe r for an ISP or other business ente rprise, does have a pot ential chillin g effect through industry and self-poli cing, including transactions invoJving dissemination and exchange of information. However, the EU Directives. to date, are Iimiled in effeci to commercial transactions and tran sactions involving businesses thai collect personal information. Besides the EU Directives. France has adopted a Libe rty of Communication Act, whicb req uires Web publishers to registe r with the govcrn menl.
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While this article has focused on barriers to information flow through legislation, regulation, and enforceme nt in the courts_ there has been a recen t significa nt case in Bri ta in in which a n ISP was found liable for a Libelous message on a bulletin board it provides. Although the case did not involve parties from ou tside Britain, the in ternat ional implications were not ed: ties to the jurisdiction.'tM T hus, the developmen ts in case law cannoL be ignored, par ticularly in Ijght of potential developments with respect to the international e nforcement of judgments.
2, Govemmel1f Filtering
Perhaps the best case for the ability of authoritarian governments to regulate the Net has been made in a recent report , which specifically foc uses on China and Cuba and was issued under the auspices of the Ca rnegie Endowment for International Peace.@ Its conclusion does no t suggest that the Internet is a significant obstacle to totalitarian rule: "Taken toge ther, the cases of Chi na and Cuba should illustrate that the diffusion of Ihe Internet does not necessarily spell the demise of authoritarian rule,,,711 Rather, authoritarian regimes fo r the present are "successfully controlli ng Internet use, eve n while using it to both extend their reach and push forward national development. ,,71
China successfu[Jy regulates potential challenges to government authori ty .. through a combi,nation of conte nt filt ering, monitoring, deterrence, and th e promotion of seH-censorship.',n Cuba, alternately, controls access, "incl uding a prohibition of individual public access and ca refuJ selecti on of instit utions tha t are allowed to connect to the Int ernet. ,,1j
Despite the Ca rnegie report 's find ings and conclusions, a careful read ing of the re port suggests th at the "jury is still o ut" on the futu re of thi s issue.
Internet tech nology will cont inue to evo lve over time, as will the myri ad nontechn ologicaJ factors tha t shape th e environm ent in which internet use tak es place; as such. our observa ti ons act as sna pshots of moving targets. Authoritarian regimes will have to contin ually adapt their measures of control if they want to cou nLer ecrectively the challenges of futu re va riations in information and communicati on technologies, It is quit e possible that this task will prove 100 difficult and th at use of rers [i nformation and communicat ion technologies] will eventually playa role in the democratic revolution that has been so widely predict ed, 1~ The most significant parts of the report are those sect ions discussing Internet use in the "mass publk. " In China, many have predicted that its 
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rising professional class will become " increasingly aware o f foreign products, cult ure, and political norms .. , B The primary response by China has been to niter and block I.n ternet materials and promote selfcensorship, I.n chat rooms, censors routinely remove offensive comments, Crackdowns encourage business owners to "self-po lice." Yet, the Ca rn egie report 's analysis misses the fundamental issue: how effect ive can filtering be? While the reporl notes that China's response to the potential political impact of the Internet on the mass public is chiefly through " [iltering material and promoting self-censorship,,,76 the report does not, and indeed perhaps cannot, give any insight into how effective those effor ts are, While there is gener al discussion of "Big Mama" -chat room administrators who screen subversive comment s, shu tting down sites within China, and blocking of foreign sites with respect to the Fal un Gong reform movement -there is no attempt to study how effect ive these techniques are or what kinds and amount of in fonnation is getting through, The report only discusses the response of the Chinese government , not its effect on in formation flow, Although primarily a question for information scientists and sociologists, the real question remains: what do Chinese citizens have access to as a res ult of the fnt ernet, and how is this different from what they had access to before the Internet? Without better information and systematic study of Internet user behavior in Chin a, any conclusions as to the impact of the Internet in China are premat ure.
What is known about China 's attempt to regu late the Internet is that it has attempted to regulate the Net using filtering and self-poli ci ng. T he first probl em with filterin g and censorship of the Net is scale.
"Secu rity agencies [in ChinaJ are spending millions of dollars to buy the latest technologies, but how can they keep track of vol umes like that?" asked Sin Chung-kai, a member of Hong Kong's Legislati ve Counci l who represents the territory'S info rmation-technology industria l seClOr. When the number of users goes over 100 million , the politica l environment will change,77 Approx imately 56,6 million Chinese have access to Ihe Internet (or 5,5% of the households in China).]/! More importantly, there are significant technological limita tions as 10 the effectiveness of filtering, For instance, a study of the efficacy of four different commercial softwar e filter p roducts revealed that only when aJt four products were combin ed, they collectively blocked objectionable materials 25 % of the [ Vo!. 2001 time and that they blocked unobjectionable ma leria1 2L3% of the lime.
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Assuming that the Chinese government found 1 % of the eight petabytes (8 x lOI S bytes) ava il able through the Web to be objectionable, or 10 terabytes (10' bytes). then using current filteri ng technology, 2.5 terabytes of objectionable material would escape filt rat ion (which is roughly the amollnt of in fo rmat ion stored in an academic research library ) .~ Like filtering softwa re, Internet surveillance systems are subject 10 technical boundaries. T he techn ica l lim itations of the FBI 's Carnivore digit al surveillance system arc indicat ive of the inherent limitations with wide-sca le Web monitoring.
sl Even without conjecture 011 th e previous statement. which was based upon the under-and over-inclusion rates o f various commercia l filtering systems, there is signifi cant evidence o f information leakage. The Washington Post reponed that while its websi te was blocked, the website of the Internationa l Herald Tribune (a paper with which it had a joint ven ture) and MSNBC.com were not. 1a lor were the South China Morning Post (a Hong Kong paper), New York Times, nor the Wa ll Street Journal./\] It is also noteworthy thal a significa nt num ber of Chinese Web su rfers -2S% of adult users, and 40 % of Ihose under eighteen -spend time at foreign si tes.~ Allhough eve ntually blocked by Chinese authorities, one anonymous proxy server (focusing on Chinese Web surfers) had an estimated 2.5 million page views per day within five months of being launched. Even if the Chi nese government develops superior filtration systems, the scale of the Internet and the inhere nt technical limitations in filter systems (whatever methods they use-key wo rd detection, site blocking, or rating systems) still permit significant information now over the Internet. Furth ermore, advances i,n technology not only help government censors, but also improve the ability of Web surfers to 79 
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ECONOMI C A NAL " SIS UI-' INI' URtvlA I JUI'<"t-LUW " circumvent censorship blocks and surf with anonymity. iW> For instance, SafeWeb (now in concert with the Voice of America) has released free peer-to-peer proxy software called Triangle Boy, specificall y designed to thwart Int ernet ce nsorship such as in Chin a.
Vol unteers can tu rn their PCs into Hpackel reflectors," or proxies. for Safe Web by installing the Triangle Boy applica tion. Si nce the Chinese gove rnment is unlikely to block access to the vo lunt eer PCs, they can act as encrypted ga teways to the Intern et and allow Cbjn ese ci tizens fu ll access 10 an uncensored Web.8' /
The potential implications of thousa nds of Web se rvers (essentially any computer with a dedicated lin e) funct ioning as proxies to "anonymize" an d encrypt Web traffic are profound-perhaps as significant as the init ial design of the Web to be dependent upon logica l and not physical add resses and to provide multiple routes for information transfer. One can imagine Western un iversities, libraries, governments, non -profits, and a host of expatriates actively promoting participa tion in vast networks to provide anonymous and un in terrupted access to information over the Web.
Th e alternative [or an authoritarian regime is 10 cut access to everything but approved sil es; however, countries like Chin a bave resisted this beca use o f the need for the economic benefits. "The great enemy of those [in China] seeking to cont rol the lnternet is its growthgrowth fu eled large ly by tlle recognitio n am ong China's reformers tha t they have no choice bUI to embrace th e Intern et if they are to compete in the global marketplace."QI Simila rly, there may be rea l economic tradeoffs fo r .restricting access to a na tional in tra net, also under discussion but repeatedly delayed.>19 "To capitalize on economic potential of a booming information sector and technologica lly savvy workforce. China needs to promote widespread Internet access while maint aining control through other means.' ,911 Less restricted access means greater potent ial for economic development, while morc restricted access may be easier to control bu t less profit able. 
TeclUl%giclll ami Regulatory Response to Demands of Business lIlId Commerce
Even if cu rrent technologies do not allow regulation of th e Net, Professor La~ence Lessig argues that as the Internet responds to the needs of busmess an? commerce by ~ha~g inl its architect ure and through the use of certi ficates of aut hentIcation, -such changes will also enable governmen ts to effectively establish jurisdictions or "zones" of regulation on the Internet. 93 While it is possible for users 10 select among such zones, referred to as "exit " power or "voting with one's feet"""-thus resuhing in a competit ion between zones of rules in cyberspace fo r users-there are costs in doing so.~ Professor Lessig also argues that the balance between "open sou rce" and "closed source" Internet applications and protocols directly affects th e abilit y of government to regulate the Net. A certi ricnte,rich Inlernet, for e)(am ple. would enable $O\'ercigns 10 reclaim some of the ir a,u!hority. I.n cyberspace where everyone carried citizenshi p Ids, the Net could be zoned 10 apply cmzco-spcclfic rules. . .. A world where ce rt ificales were gene rally available would be a world where states cou ld again insisl that their rule$ be applied, not the rules Qf the dQmi!1ant na tiQn (t he Uni ted States) or the Nec. III. Leuig assumes tho l certifica tes will permit identification Qn some political·googr3phical basis. a necessary requirement fQr sovereign jurisdiction and enforcement. Whethe r the e"olution of t he Web 10 ."'eet Ih~. nl~ds ~f comm~rce will pr~1ICf! such a mechanism remains 10 be seen. Certai nl y.
SWluen&ml s h,stOrical bank.IIlg laws. whIch placed a premium on anQnymity. demonstnll e thn l commerce can be condUCled securely with anonymity from governme nt inquiry. Because open-source code can be freely copied and modified, it does little good for governments to pressu re industries to accommoda.le state interests. A particular service can be easily co-opted and modified by a competitor who uses open source code and who might not be so sensitive to government pressure.
The nex t poi nt in Professor Lessig's argumen t is that the balan ce between "open" and "closed" code is not fixed. and needs 10 be monitored.
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In essence, a shift to closed code oUght to enhance government power to regulat e.<18 It also bolsters the power of business to stifle competition and even control contenl.l'l Consequent ly, a shift to closed code favors governme nt regulatory power, and an in dustry movement in that direction would suggest, per Lessig's argument, that much more rigid Internet regul ation would become possible. It should be noted, however, that other factors besides the balance of closed and open code may influence whether a particular service or product can be easily co-opted by competi tors, who ma y be beyond the reach of government regulators. For instance, competitors of Yahool in France may offer We b services to customers tha t are non-IP-based. which would allow geographical ly indistinct or anonymous browsing"» an d thereby diminish Yahoo!'s French market share and indirectly underm ine the effica cy of a French court 's order which compelled Yahoo! to ban French users from sites selling Nazi materials.
101 Consequently, the ba lance and trends of closed versus ope n code does not solely determine govern me nt ability to regulate Internet information flow.
New technologies not on ly enable governmen t regulatory muscle,' 0.2 they elicit regu lation as to the demands of business and industry which cause them to affect information fl ow over the Internet, sometimes in an unforeseen manner. For instance, in an essay introducing his newest 96. Id. I'll 106·07, 97. Id. at 104 ('" 11 is (his balance thOI we need to track. -the b31~ncc be(we~n o(>'!n and closed eQde on the Net Most of the "pplicatioT! space that o rdinary u~el1'l now lISe is closed,"). The ease of moving and obtaining Web se rvers (such as illustrated by unsuccessful atte mpts to regula te SH AC). the transferability, plasti city and ubiqu ity of o pen-so urce code, and the rea lit ies of an o nymo us and geographically ind istinct Web surfing substant iate the axio m that " the Inte rnet in terprets censorship as damage a nd roUles a ro und it.' IIUM Not surprisingly and quit e sensibly, eve n Singapo re , with its re latively aggressive standards fo r regulating ISPs, acknowledges the fut ility of completely regulat ing the Net:
T o fuUy cont rol wh at goes o n in the Inte rn et is not possible and it is not our intention to do so. We will therefore adopt a pragma tic a pproach in formulating o ur regulatory framewo rk : o ne which regula tes by exception, ensures minimum standards a re kept and e ncourages The question , howeve r, has never been o ne of total governme nt control o r total freedom to surf witho ut restrictions. but whether the Internet has the potent ia l to affect profo und change even in the most . . . llO restnctlve government regImes.
Summary
In light of the incidents in Ge rm any and France , the th eore tica l a rguments made by Professor Lessig, a nd in considera tio n of the im perfect policies of Singapore a nd China, the presence of e ffectiv e regu latory borders in cyberspace is subject to do ubt a nd ra ises the question: what are the consequences fo r governmen ts and states if the Internet cannot be regu la ted , or only partially regulated?
II. MARK ET FOR L OYALT IES TH EORY
1n a series of articles and books.lll Mo nroe E. Price. a professor of law at C.udozo School of Law.
ll l has a rgued lhat the beh avior of sla les in regulating transborder informati o n flow , pa rticularly inte rn atio na l broadcasting. can be e xplained by wh at he terms " the ma rke t for loyalties. ,,11 3 This markel , a lthough differe nt from the marke t fo r goods 110. Thcre is evidcnce that the Inlcrnet is fundamen mlly affecti ng China dcspile liS alle n;lplS 10 exe rl rigid conlrols. a nd th e " marke t of ideas," ca n be described as the excha nge of " identity"
(supplied by go vernments and tradit iona l power structures) fo r loyalty fro m their constituents and subjects. This " market for loyalt ies" adhe res to economic concepts such as buye rs and sellers, cu rre ncy, mo nopoly, regula tion, competition, and supply and demand.
A. Summary of Professor Price's Application oJ Economic Th eory
Professor Price has proposed application of an economic theory, kno wn as the "market for loya lties," to explain the mo nopolistic and oligopolistic behavior of states and their power holde rs have in trading naliona l ide nti ty for loyalty. Competing identities (ide ntities sponsored by someone other than the stale and its constituent power e lites) a re provided both by groups seeking power (whether ent ire ly withi n na tional bounda ri es o r transcending them) , and by Western commercia l culture.
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Because these competin g ident ities weaken Lhe value of the national identity,"S which governments trade for the loyalty of the ir citize ns , governmen ts often work to restrict the e ntrance of competitors into the loya lt y market. Besides direct censorship, government restrictions in tb e broadcast media include suppressing broadcasting from beyond national borders, maintaining a nat iona l broadcasting monopoly, restricting the numbe r a nd licensing of freque ncies, and imposing frequent licensing renewal req uirements." 6 An additional characteristic of media regulation is tha t it reflects the existing power structu re, and predictably, it is o nly changed if it fai ls to protect the existing power structure's marketin g of ide ntity or if the po wer structur e shjfts to diffe rent parties.
Elements a/The Market
This section witl set forth the elements of the " ma rke t for loyalties"-scllers, buyers, products, and currencies of exchange-a nd will look mo re closely at the pa rties and values playing the va rious economic roles in the market.
Acco rding to Professor Price, governments regul ate in formatio n flow because they are compet ing for loyally or allegiance in a ma rket. PII.i\C. 191. 19J (20CX». D"~pit" the "ma rk et for eyeba ll s" bei ng in ~og ue. the a uthor prefers the term "market (or loyalties.~ While " marke t for eyeballs" conveys the sense of ad~erti~ing to attract a n aud ience. the "market for loyaltics.~ a~ explained by Professor Price. cBptures the essence of the "idcntity~ for "loyalty" ""change. Furthermore. "loyalty" suggests more than {KW'ive "brand recognition" rathe r than active commilme ntto SOffiCthing. 
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83 the regulato rs o ( infor mation in the marke t. In applying bis mark et analogy to radio, cable a nd satellite broadcasting regulation, Professor Price describes a broader concept , ide ntifying those who play lb e roles of selle rs in the marketplace:
[T]he supply side[, the selle r,] in the marke t for loyalties has a struct ure lhat is badly served by reductionist te rms like 'state,' or 'government ,' or political party. The sellers in this ma rke t are a ll lhose for whom myths and dreams and histo ry can some how be converted into power and wealth -classica lly slates, governments, . b · d h '" mterest groups, uSllless an ot e rs. In other words, selle rs in the " market [or loyalties" are those parties with a message that can be traded for loyal fo llowe rs and power. Thai message can consist of a party platform, ideology, o r na tional idea ls and aspirations. It may be as ephemera l as the hope for a beLler future or as concrete as the desire for a national homeland. Ide ntity is valuable to buyers as it contains both the legacy of their past history and the promise of their dreams for th e future (wbether it is for weal th , a better life, o r an ed ucation). For example, " [r]adio became instrumental [to the state] as a forum for explanation , for patriotism , fo r mobilization, and for maintaining morale in the Second World War.""~ The buyers in this market are cit izens a nd the currency in this ma rke t is loya lty.
The "buyers" are citizens, subjects, nationa ls, consumersrecipients of the packages of in fo rmation, propaganda. advertiseme nts, drama, and news propo unded by the media. The consume r " pays" for o ne set of identities or another in several ways that, together, we call "loyalty" or "citizenship." Paymen t, bowever, is not expressed in the ordinary coin of the realm: It includes not o nly compliance with tax obligations, but also obedience to laws, read iness to fight in armed services, o r even continued residence within the coulliry. The buyer also pays with his or her own sense of identity. t20 Although in Professor Pricc's "market for loya lties," it is identi ty that is purchased by citize ns, he notes that the excha nge ra te fo r loyalty (or cost to the seller) can be quite high, as in the instance of d raft compli ance a nd historical incidents of mass desertion .'ll In such circumsta nces, the price But studies of complia nce. desertion. or the burdens of raising an army through means Other than conscription suggest that Ihe cost o f loyalty is sometimes quite high. History is $Iudde<:l with caSt!$ where mass desenion Iw.J mea m the e nd of an empire; whe re 1111 of a sudden. the dUly 10 light for a particular ClO Use can no longer be enforced. Id. o f loyalty is measured by the cost of an a lt ernative and its conseq uences (the risk of desertion , th e effect of mass desertion all the state). A simple representa tion of the e le ments of the "marke t for. loyalties" may be presented as follows:
Economic Term
Market for Lo\'ulties Sellers Governments
Buvers Ci tizens
Price/Currency
Lo~1iV
Goods
Idcnli lv
Professor Pri ce describes all of the elements of a classic marketbuyers, sellers, products, curre ncy, exchange and price (as de termin ed by the va lue of the alte rnative)-a nd equales those elements with the consti tue nt e leme nts of the relationsh ip be tween a sovereign and its subjects. A more thorough understa nding of Professor Price's " market for loyalties," however, requires an examination of the dynamics of the market 's exchange-the bartering of identity for loya lty.
C. IdelllilY and the Competition for Loya{ty
The preoccupation of many au th ori taria n governments with the regulation of advertising, particularly Western advertising, illustra tes Ihe re lationship of identity and the competition for loyalty. Even the adve rtising of commercial goods can th reaten market ide ntity.
T he preoccupation that governme nts have long had with limiting adve rtising messages a nd excluding competition (rom commercial broadcasters suggests that the impact of programming on public allegiances yields a substitute for more traditional packages of identity. . .. In this sense, marketers of pure nat iona l ident ities, and ideologies tbat parade as such, compe te with sellers of consu me r goods who are trying to impress the citizen with an other identity. Here the question is how a person , certainly one in a developed society, decides, at the margin, whether a higher or lower percentage of disposable income should go to the state (in taxes), say for education or e nvironmen tal protection (to be generous), or, instead, for p ersonal goods like food or te levision sets or aUlomobil es. 
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choice. m U lt imate ly. states a nd their constituen t governing powers are concerned about the poten li<l\ for rh e marketing of competing ident ities to destabilize the existin g status quo.
D. De:itabilizillg Influellces-Competing Groups (Jnd Western Commercial Clllltire
There are two distinct destabilizing influences, pe rceived or rea l, which evoke a reaction from authoritarian states: (1) threa ts to national ide ntity (rom et hnic communi ties, religious groups, or sectors of socie ty from within the sta te, or wh ich transccud tradit ional national bounda ries; a nd (2) Western commercial culture.
I. Competillg {mernal Groups
Not a ll competiti ve identities origin ate abroad or can be characterized as " foreign influences."
For exam ple, the secu lar government of Turkey has been cha ll enged by domestic Islamic groups and has responded in both an offensive a nd defensive mode with Ihe media:
Si nce the rise of Kema l Ataturk, the Turkish government has considered Islamic sects, groups now labeled " fun damen tali sts," a threat 10 the secu lar state and has soughl to limit Ihe use of mass media by these religious competitors. Turkish Radio and Te levision Authority (TRT) has not only been monopolistic, " it [has] a lso essentially [bee n] the voice of the state, disseminating the unitary ideology and culture of Turk ish republicanism and lsicl highly susceptible to government intervention."ll. Fundamentalist Islamic broadcasts, even if originating within Turkey. a re perceived as a threat by Turkey's secular government. 11 is not surpris ing that the gove rnment of Turkey has maiOlained tight control over its media, both to disseminate its own views and to keep its opponents, many of whom are of domestic origin, from voicing the ir own messages.
Professor Price explains:
We see assertions of national identity in the interstices of commercials, in Iheir depiction of Idealized home life. opportunities to travel , oTet'rtain idea of traditional fnmily values. Arguably. 
Effect of Westem Commercial Broadcasting alld Culture
Competing identities, iden tities other than those supplied by the Sta te and the existing power struct ure, originate not on ly [rom ind igenous groups within a particular cou ntry, but (rom fore ign sources as well. The effect of foreign commercial speech can destabilize , or be perceived as destabi lizing, tota litarian and third world governm ents and potentially th e democratic institutions of the primary a nd secondary wo rl d powers. Destabilizat ion resul ts if there is a sudde n decrease in price (loya lty) exchanged for the ide ntity supplied by Ihe State and traditional power holders. In fact , Western advert ising (a form of competing identity) has been credited with contributing to the demise of commun ism in Eastern Europe.
The most avid proponen ts of free market television have, consistent with this position, argued that the images of Western socie ty, includi ng its advertising, are entitled to some of the credit for the fall of the Be rlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The point here, of course, is not the truth of the claims about th e impact of messages, but the perception of that impact and th e rhetorical use of it in rendering markets more open or closed. The threat of Western broadcasting has been acknowledged by tbe Chinese government. In a statement from China's Min ist ry of Radio, Film, a nd Te levision, such broadcasting is expressly recognized as de trime ntal to China's nationa l va lues and sense of ident ity:
Int ernational sa telli te dissemination conducted by Western developed countr ies th rea tens the independence and identity of China's nationa l cu lt ure. We should seriously dea l wit h this sit uat ion. These [cultural] fa ctors include loving the mothe rland, hard work, advoca ting industry and thrift, ... taking a keen in te rest in science, attaChi ng importance to cult ure, ... and slressing mora l cou rag;e . The nat iona l spirit conta ins patriotism, collectivism, hard work Isic) and bravery, defying bru tal force and daring to fight ... 
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Precisely because of this, we take seriously the infringement of overseas radio and television a nd the influe nce they bring which hampers the nat ional spirit to expa nd. Given the role (whet he r perceived or actual) of Weste rn commercial cullure in destabi lizing the former Soviet Union a nd 1he former communist slates of Eastern Europe, Ch ina 's concern cannOl be dismissed as mere paranoia, but rather it represents an astute awareness of the classic divide between the val ues espoused by the comm unist stale and those portrayed and promulgated by the Western media.l21
E. Regulation to Preserve Monopoly (or Oligopoly) of Identity
To protect their market share, and also to reduce the price of loyally (or correspondingly to increase the va lue of na tional identity), governments, states and the existing power struct ures attempt to limit competition in the market.
In this market, large-sca le competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, use media regulation to orga nize a cartel among themselves, Regulatory arrangements reflect a competition not only for goods, but also for minds and sou ls. suf(icie nt marke t power over loya lties to assure its continued existence. 1 2$ During the beginning and thro ugho ut the late twentieth century, sta tes restricted competition through seve ral means ot her than direct censorship: (1) suppression of broadcasls (rom outside their borders,12!I (2) retention o f a national monopoly on broadcasting, as in Great Bri tain and other Eastern and Western Eurogean counlrie-s,U) (3) limitations on the distribution o f radio freq ue ncies,' I and (4) licensing of broadcasters wit h req uired renewa ls which could be objected. Not all o f the mea ns of media regulation a re direct and obvious. Consider the fo urth st rategy with respect to broadcast licensing in the United Sta tes:
Whi le the Comm un ica tions Act of 1934 prohibits the FCC [rom engagi ng in censorship, the very process of licensing radio and television stmions acts as a major constraint on the compet ition for loya lties. Compet ition for federal licenses and the requirem en t o f a renewal (every three years in te levision 's "golden age") in evitab ly affects the range of views exp ressed. While that range has been The euiest and most obvious barrier 10 cnlry is II Iimitatioll on the number of television ehanncls a"ailable for publi~ vie,,·ing. A dramatic example of cultural protectionism achiel'ed through a maintained scarcity occurred in ap&rtheld [sk1 South Africa. ",here the government b<mned tClevisiOll until 1976. The National l'~rty felt that American and British programming "'ould threaten the AfrikaalL~ langullge and undermine the ~multinationalism~ ofits Bantustan system. Id .. 3t 696, n.I~.
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q uite wide, and renewal o f li censes is typically automalic. the possibility that a valuable asset could be losl is an effective f f . '" a rgument or con ormlty.
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The tools of media regulation are diverse and sometimes even SUbtle, as the ir operations are designed to effect a chi lling of behavior in response to a pe rceived risk. In spite of thei r subtlety, they are potent.
F. Reflecting Ihe EXisting Power Structllre
R egula tion of media to protect na tional iden tity is not necessari ly limited to a policy designed to project a single identity. Even highly+ developed democra tic states with plura listic systems act in such a way as to p rotect the existing status quo.
Rather than having a single state broadcaster, the Dutch long ago established a complex mechanism that gave each segment o f socie ty an unencumbered opportunity to broadcast to its own community, first on rad io, the n o n tele vision. Groups competed for broadcast time, with awards lin ked to the n umbe r of members or adhere nts each gro up co uld claim .... A s a res ult , Dutcb society remained plurali stic, wit h each group spea king to its own members and nOl proselytizing ot hers. tll In spite of the plura li stic nature of Dutch media a nd broadcasting, it s power str ucture sought to restrict new entrants, viewing them as threa ts to the accepted messages of Dutch iden tity.'.l-I Professor Price d escribes sim ilar systems in Italy, I~ G erma nyl'" and Belgium . Not o Dlr does media regulatio n re nect' the existing power structure, Pro (e~or. Pnce p roposes tha t media regulations o nly change wbe n: "( I) the eXlstmg set o f b roadcasting laws is inadequate to pe rform the ca rtelizatio n [unctio n; or (2) the ' na tional identity' has changed o r is 132. Jd, al 688. 133. /d. al 678. Wlule some may argue Ihat IMny democracies described bv Professor Price such as. in thc. Netherlands, do not. in f~cl. mHin~aill monopoly cont rol of broadeasti~g. thcy do Junction as ohgopohes or HtlclI5t aClto make 1\ more dllficult for n~w iden tities to ~mer the mark el.
IJ4: Ha Y.ing liYed I~ the Nctherlands and Belgium. the aU lh",r is (l<'rsonally acquainted with Radio Ve rOnica, wh!ch began liS operations as H "pirate"' rlldio station on a ship off of {he Dutch const with the phenomenon of pirate radio in the Netherlnnd~ lind BClgium. Set gc"cmlly Nicck Ammerlaan, changing and legislation is necessary to legitimate tbe ne w players and , in turn to protect them against unregulated challenge.',ulI This represe nts o ne 'of the logically derivable condusions of the " mark et for loyalties" theory -media regulation is only altered when (1) prior regulation is inadequate to protect the existing power car tel or (2) a shift in the balance of power occurs.
. A I'PLICATION O FTHE ECONOMIC M OD EL TO EXPLA IN R EGULATION OF THE L'lTERNET
H aving explained Professor Price's " market for loyalties" theory, and ha ving considered the issue of whether tbe Internet can ind eed be regulat ed, this paper will now go beyond Professor Price's a pplicati on of the theory and consid er what happens wh en a monopoly loses conlrol of the marke t. In applying the " market for loyalties" theory to the problem, thi s paper will apply an economic analysis, including ec~n~m ic concepts of elasticity and substitutes, to make some general prediction s. Spedficall y, this paper wi ll compare the efficie~cy of two. diffe re~1 marke ts (fo r loya lti es) and consider the role elast"lclly pla 6
s In each III determining the potential disruption caused by the Internet. 39
A. COIIseqllellces If Government Is Unable to Regulate A cco rding (0 Economic Model
I. General Predictiotls
Gene rally, Professor Price's " market for loyalties" theory predicts that gove rn ments, and the ir constitue nt power bases, will attempt . to establish monopoly positions wherever possible in cont rol ling in (o rnla tion now over the In ternet, a nd tha t upon faili ng to do so, the impact of competition will ei the r fo rce tJl em to compete more e ffective ly 139. Price focuses on bro~dcastins rath er than on the Internet when ~pplying his "market for Il.lyalties" th~ory. He does mention th e Im crnet in several of his articles not all ofwh;~h deal with the "market for loya lt ies" thcory. within the contc~t of regu lating brOlldtasting and ot her media as a wbole. but makes no reference to the "market for loyalties" theory); T I' LIlVtStON. Sl'pra note Ill. at 227 (relatin g the slatement "the aUlhurily society to interve ne ... dedine~ with the lailOTing of information" to the Internet. but does not Applyi ng the "market ror 10yalties"lheory).
f>rofCSllor Price also briefly ~ck.nowledgt'5 the importBnce of e la$ticity in two o f his articl~. Ste Comparolive Mrdia LDw. supra nOle Ill. At 465 n.19 and Market/or Loyoln·u.3"pro note Ill. at 705 n.37.
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(or loya lty or receive less of it in exchange for identity. uo Th is is simply an exercise in applying the supply and de mand curves used in traditio nal econo mics-as tbe supply of identity (from competing factions and enterprises with the governme nt) increases, its price will fall , assuming Ihat de mand does not increase.
For example, in Figure 1 ,tU suppose the supply of identity is restricted by a governme nt"imposed monopoly to 5.75 units a l point Q", (this point is determined by the intersection of a monopolist's '; Margin al Cost" and " Marginal Revenue" curves, which is at point cyu and that the corresponding price that ('he government cha rges, in terms of loyalty, is about 17.5 loyalty units (point p,.yo This price al P," is determined by the intersect jon of a vertica l li ne fro m Q", and the demand curve (which applies regardless of wheth er the re is a mono poly or competitive market). Upon removal of the monopoly concern, eq uilibrium and market efficiency is achi eved in this example at seven units of iden ti ty and about 16 units of loyalty (point b). Essen ti ally. mo nopolists " underproduce" and overcharge,
The shaded region bounded by points n, b, and c in Figure 1 14 •
represents th e ine fficiency in th e ma rket -both the underproduction of identity and the artificial inflation of its price, More importantly, the vertical distance be twee n (l and b (or Pm -Po) represenls the instability (from the decline in loyalty) resulting (rom a government or state's loss of monopoly cont ro l over informatio n flow (i.e., loss of control over the supply of identity in the market place). Correspondingly, the horizont al 140. For instance. II decli ne ill loyalty may re$ult in Ihe inability of a government to raise armies. laxes. and gencrally impose s:w:rifice~ on its ci ti~elUi. Gove rnments may compete more vigorously for loyalty by propaganda or ~d"ertising campaigns-for example. roadway and public work.<; signs that say, " paid for by your tax dollars." II may cI'en be argued thaI recent trends to re-cngineer go,'ernmenl (such as former Vice President Al Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Governmenl ) reOect the need of government 10 compete for loyalty. Ser Reim'errliOfl Principles. Of hllp:llgovinfoJibrary.unteduinprlJibra ryfpaperslbkgrdf princip. html (laSI modified Sep. 22. 1998) (~We will: Injec:t oompet;tion inlO everything we dol:l [slea reh for market. not adminis trative solutionsl:) !m)easure our successes by customer $lllisraction[ .I"). See a/so Exec. Order No. 12862.58 Fed. Reg. 48.257 (Sepl. II . 1993) .
PU ll ing people firs t means ensuring that the Fede ral G overnment provides th e highest quality service possible 10 the American people. Publk officinls must embark upon a re~olul ion within th e Fed., ral GOvernment 10 change Lh e way it does business. This will requ ire continua! refo rm of th e executive: branch'S managemen t practice aud operations to provide service to the publi e Ihat mOlc/'es or uc£ed$lhe but service IlI'oi/I,ble ill Ihe p,,'v(l//! se"or.
Id (e mphasis Added). Th e e mphasis clearly a ppear.,; to be on competing with or "m~lch ing" the level 143. For monopolies. supply curves Dnd margina l cost curves are ideu tie.1 L See: id. at 174 (" When this s upply -and demand model ;s co nvert ed 10 represent a monopolist as opposed to a number of compelitors. the industry suppl y curve becomes the monopolist's marginal cost curve and the indus try 's demand curve be(:omes the dern,1nd fae ing Ihe sole producer."). The rationale is tha i a IIIQnopoly su pplier ",ill sotlhe Ic~cl of production at the inte rsection of its marginal COSt and marginal revenue. Conseque ntly. a monopolist's supply eurve also hns to run through th is point and end~ up exaclly follOl'ing Ihe monopolist's marginal cost eurve.
144. See Appendix.
JO URNA L OF LAW. TECHNOLOGY & POLI CY (Vol. 2001 distance between a and b (or Q", -Q.) represents the degree of choice that an individual has to select among competing identities in a society. T he implication of governmen ts, and their power constituents, not bei ng able to create an artificially high monopoly price fo r identity could be significant. T he price of identity (as measured in loyalty) lhal the state needs from its subjects to exact military service, voluntary payment of taxes (as is the case in most democracies), and in some instances, continued residence in the count ry/4~ can be quite high. Of course, the alternative for the sta le is to compete by producing evermore valuable forms of identi ty (i.e. , sold at a greater unit price or by legitima tely captu ring a larger share of the iden tity market from its competitors).'<06 A st ra tegy of increasing the sta te's market share of identit y (without fundament ally changing or introducing new kinds of identi ty as prod ucts) will not shift the demand curve or increase price, in terms of loya lty, nor will it make th e state more profitable (sin ce the state would have to expa nd it s producti on to where marginal cost exceeds the margin al
Havin g addressed the general consequences of Professor Pri ce's "mark et for loya lties" theory and having consi dered the implications of regulating the Internet, th is article will now examine some specific cases.
Predictions for Singapore's Efforts
Gi ven the difficulty in regu lating the Internet, and the gene ral implications of the failure to limi t compet ition (as per the " market fo r loyah ies" model). what predictions migh t be made about Singapore's eITon s to regu late the Internet? Ge nerally. loyalty falls with increased compet it ion for identity, but how much, and would such a drop have a signi fi cant effec t? Professor Price's theory tells us that if Singapore is successful it will be able to exact a higher price in the exchange of loyalt y for iden tity. ll1ere is a cost to mainta in ing a monopolistic hold on the fl ow o f information: the economic. educational, and scientific a.dvan tages of Ih e Int ernet may not be fully realized. As illustrated in the case where Germany successfu ll y coe rced one of its ISPs (T-Online) to ban access to 145. For ins!tmce. th e Fcdcralcd Stales of Micronesia has been losing signi fican t pop ulation 10 hig.he r p~)'ing jobs und S I~nlJ Ard5 of livin g in other countri es. AboUi 19% of its cililcns live abroad. certain neo-Nazi sites, the consequence was that more than one tho usand unobjectionable sites were also ba nned because of the inability to selectively filler sites.
lolS
The reaction of the lnternet community (by setting up mirror sites at un iversi ties)!~~ compounds the problem beca use banning these add itional sites will inevitably lead to the inability to access useful economic and scie ntific info rmation on sites hosted by university servers. As Genera l MacA rthur is said to have protested duriog the Korea n war, it is im possible to bom b "half of a bridge"-it 's the whole bridge or noth ing. ' 50 In the end, Singapore's efforts to impose liabili ty 0 0 ISPs under a "best endeavors" sta ndard may prove to be a fair ly ineffeclive sieve. Blocked sites, which cannot be blocked wit h an y surgical precision, are commonly "mirrored" at university sit es,'-'! access to which is vital to Singapore's con tinued growth. m "Best endeavors" may qu ickly be reduced to a "one-time" blockin g rule and lead to the distribution of screening software to Int ernet users-not a great hurdle to the [low of information over the Int erne!.
Assuming that Singapore is una ble to regulate the flow of information via th e Int erne.! , what are the conseq uences? According to Professor Price's model, th e price of identity as paid in loyalty will have to drop. Singapore is the 13th largest tradi ng country in the world , has an unemployment rate of aboul 3.5%, and receives no aid from the United States. tSl Polit ica l loyalty is more easi ly purchased by the incumbent regin1e in a strong economy. Singapore's government alr eady competes for identity as a result of commercial adve n ising.
tS4 In essence,
Singapore may have a fair ly horizontal (or "elastic") dema nd curve for the identity it exchanges (or loyalty!S5
In other words, increased competition for identity may not resu lt in significant reduct ion in the amou nl of loyalty which Singapore's citizens are willing to pay in exchange . Suppose thai as a result of widespread Internet access in Singapore, the existing power structure loses much of its ability to control the flow of information, and consequently, the re is a n influx of competing identities (i.e., political and socia l agendas at odds wit h tbe va lues oWciaUy espoused by the existing governmen t of Singapore) . In Figure 2 / S6 movement from point a (in which the slate has established monopoly co.n trel over identity, thus keepi.ng the price a rti(iciaUy high) to. peint b (or equilibrium as a result ef the Inte rnet's introduct ion of cempeting identities into th e market fo r leyalty) dees not have a dramatic destabilizing effect. T he vertical distance (representing the drop in price in terms of loyahy) between p .. and p~ is minuscule.
The shaded area representing the inefficiency in the ma rket is also relatively small. In addition , note that the declining slope ef the margina l revenue curve (t he intersection e f th e marginal re ve nu e and margi na l cost curves at peint c determin es Ihe level of productie n along the demand curve or point a) is purely a function of the demand curve. !S1 Consequently, it is net rea lly a n additiena l, independent variable affecting the degree of instability (or drop in the price, in tenns of loyalty) caused by the shift to equilibrium. Assuming a horizontal dema nd curve, the effects of fr ee infermation flow will not have a ny significa nt destabilizing eHects .
The major facte r in determinin g elast icity is the presence of substitutes.!521 The argument, in economic te rms, is that Singapere a lready has an abundance of substitute identities (beyond those supplied by its governmen t) as a resull of Singa~re's long embrace o.f free markets and Weste rn commercia l culture. ~ Another a rgument is that Singapore's citizens, as a result or their superior econom ic status, a re able to expend more e n compe ting ide ntiti es and, conseq ue ntly, are not required to cut back e ll expenditu res of loya lty in favo.r o.f the go.vernment. In essence, il is not simply an "eithe r-o.r" propo.sitio.n as cha racterized in a static " pie cha rt" eco.no.my, bUI an issue o.f dyna mic economies in which the a mou nt o.f reso.urces which cit izens have to' spend 155. In eCOIlQmics, the. pitch o f II demand curve is referred to as its '· elasticity.-The more liorizontallhc curve. the more the demand is said to be clastic. Su MOD ERN PoLmCA L EcoNOMY. supra note 142. al 41. fig. 3 
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95 is inconstant and capable o.f significa nt growth.!"' " Hence, tbe conclusion that Singapore will net be signi rican tly affected by free in fonnation fl ow is compatible with eco.no.m ic concepts such as "elasticity" a nd "substitutes," which j ustify {he use of a re latively horizontal dema nd curve.
Predictions for China's Effo rts
China 's effo.rts to. regula te the Internet, in comparison to.
Singapore's exertions, are mo re com pre enslve. e flS 0 destabilizatien like wise is grea te r. China 's strategy for cont ro lling information now has been two-fold: (1) " limiting access to a ma nagea ble number of users" such as professiona ls. and (2) tI1e creation of a "secure network in which Ch inese users will have unlimited access to. each e ther," but be hind a softwa re firewalJ which blocked objectio.nable materia l from the o utside world . flll These strategies have been criticized (or reasons simila r to. these re lating to Singapore's effo.rts-the difficu lty in surgically blocking so.me sites while still being able to access ec~non~i~a llr6.J and scientifically valuable si tes, such as these found at UOlverSltles.
Assuming tha t C hina is unable to. regulate info.rmation flew ever the Internet. what are the consequences? China 's econo.my, altho.ugh rapidly growing. is ne t as streng (in pro.po.rtio.n to. its size) as that o.f Singapo.re.
It bas an es timated urban une mplo.yme nt rate o.f roughly ten percent, exte rnal debt of $162 billion , and exports o.f $232 biHion '6< (co.mpared to tiny Singapore's $137 billion in cxports),lM and Gross Do.mestic Product ("GDP") per capita of $3,60(Y66 (co.mpared to Singapore 's per capita GOP o.f S26.500).tb7 Thus, China is not in as secure a po.sition as Singapore. H China wants to. co.mpete with the ide ntit ies o.ffe red by Western commercial culture like Singapore, whose advertising and media reflect a much higher per capita GOP,t6ll it may find that the price o.f identity drops significantly. In essence, China's demand curve fer identity may be inelastic, and as a result, the price of lo.yalty may faU precipitously with increased compe tition. 16t. In spi te or China's rigorous effort to regula te the Net, th er¢. T he potential risk of destabilization as a result of the Interne t (and the introduction ofcompcting identities) is significant ly greater in China than in Singapore. Ln Figure 3 .
1711 the relative inefficiency (a nd potential fo r destabiJjzat ion) in the "market fo r loyalties'-(When compa red to Si ngapore in Figure 2111 ) is indicated by the shaded area bo unded by a, b, and c. Movement [rom point (/ (which is artificial ly maintained by monopoly) to point b (equi li brium) , even though only representing a 1.5-unit increase in ident ity (Ihe d istance from Q,,, to QJ. prod uces significa n t discord (a (ou r-unit decrease) as a resu lt of the reduction in the price of loyalty (or the distance (rom P", to PJ Note if the dema nd curve fo r C hi na is steeper than for Singapo re, as has been argued above. the n the margi nal revenue curve. wh ich is solely derived from the d emand, will a lso become m uch sleeper. In Beca use the margina l reven ue curve shifts wi th the demand cu rve. it is not an independent variable in accounting for the degree o r instabilit y caused by increased competition among suppliers of identity.
Destabilization of a country of 1.2 billion people natu rally shou ld give us pa use,lT.l particularly in ligh t o f the tumult uous history in Russia and the fonner Soviet states si nce the era of G lasnost. It may be that China needs incremental exposure to Wes tern culture before il is ready fo r unrestricted access to the Internet and Western cult ure. On the ot her hand. it may be impossible to restrict access to information over the In ternet. T his would lead to the unavoidable conseq uence that China may have to compete mo re aggressively (or the loya lly of ils citizens, who may become increasingly e namored with Western culture. Such a cycle would necessitate yet further reform. The fai lure to compete effectively will ult imately resull in (l shift of power and political d estabilization .
Exrrapolarillg from Elasricity -Additional TI1eori zillg
The hidden premise presented in Ihe Singapore and Chi na examples above is tha t inelasticity, or a sudden drama tic drop in loya lty as a result of a n increased supply of iden tity. equa tes to pol itical instability since the state must work harde r to win loyalty or risk losing its market sha re, th us end ing up in a weaker position. Given that the principal factor in determ ini ng e lasticity is the presence of subslitules,17~ it may be extrapolated that the political instability resulting from an increased supply o f ident ity (a nd shift in price) is in versely relaled to the p rior pe netratio n of competing sources of iden t i~ (or substitutes) in the market. This may be expressed as a fu nction:
where " j" is th e in sta bility, " k " re presents the leve l of new competing identities be ing introd uced, and " p" is the penet ration of previously co mpe ting ide ntjties, or substitu tes, in lO the markel.
' 76 Eventually, in a slate tha t o pe ns itself to compet ing identities, if "p" were to approach infinity, the level of d istu rba nce will grow infinitesima lly sma U in (at least with respect to the insta bil ity caused sole ly by the introduct ion of new "d "") 'n I enll1les :
115. l ne relationship is ~Kprfssed as a funclion Ix-cause it IS incomplete. For inSl8nce. the a uthOr'S argumen ts about the economic viability of Singupore nnd China. in comp~ri son to ench olhtr. h8 ve no! been la ken in to Ilcco unt in the formu la. Sce supra nOtes 153·155 and 164-167. and accompanying text. Perhaps econom ic viability is indirectly accounted ror by the factoring in of substitutes or "p:' II can be argued that heallhler economics are more open and lire amenable to the prese nce of sUbshtUte or competing idcnlities. HO"''l!ver, much morc information and study is needed to establish such a relationship.
In addi tion. no accoun ting is IlUldc for the impacI of marginal revenue liS a separate VlIriabie. whidl is used to dete rmine whe re II monopoly will set its level of prodllCtion on its demand curve. This is beca~ marginal re"en ue is di rectly derived from the demand curve and is nOI an independent variable. See mpro note 156 and accompnn}ing tfxt.
176. Fo r purposes of simplicity, lhis paper will nOI consider factol'll sueh as disparate ~margin"1 utili ty of equivalen t qU 3 n lit~ substitute goods: ' consumcrs-~ i.e., the cha nge in the number of consumers in relation to price~as important (actol'S to e lasticity in addition to substitution). See also Slipra note 160 and accompanying tcxt (suggesting how such fac tors translate into the "marke t for loynlties" theory with respect to Singap<Jre). This is yet another reason why the inswbility relationship to identity must be expressed liS a function mther than ~ complete . eq uation. However. the equation is useful in determining Ihe effects of identity being Introduced mto the market for loya lly as in thc instance of !he expl osive growth of the Interne\. vigorous hislOrica l analysis (as well as consideration of other fa ctors) is required to confirm this conc1 usion .1lI' 2 Notwith standing the additional stability brought about by increasing diversity of identities, there is a point at which so urces for substitute identities will not e nter the market. "In none of these [cjases ca n the price, in the long run, rise beyond the level which ind uces further ent ry, and the profit·maximizing price may lie considerably below this upper Iimit."UI3 A.5 a corollary, in no case will the supply of iden ti ty substitutes rise above a level at which no additional suppliers would e nter the market at the gOing rate of exchange for loyalty (Le. , above the "profitmaximizing price").
In th e end, the mathemalical expression of the relationship of instability to substitute identities is a fonnal and concise way of saying what is intuitive to most everyone, that it is roughest at the beginning for societies in the process of opening tbemselves to competin a visions of identity, and as a coroUary, that the most restriClive regimes"experience the greatest turmoil from the presence of new sources of identity. '~ The implications for the Internet are profound. Authoritarian sw tes, with a history of rest rictive regulation of information now, will experi ence the greatest instability because of the introduction of competing identities. On the other hand , states that auempt to seal themselves off (rom such a challenge by "firewaUing" themselves from contact wit h the rest of the world , or limiting Internet access to an elite few, risk missing the fr uits of Internet connectivity and fallin g further behind in the race to close the "information gap" with Western countries. ISS . 1S2: For .the sake of argunwnt, the author has intentionally eQl1i~OCHted unity with B lack of dlV"~'IY (haVing don~!;(1 becaur.e this is a common misconception). However, unity has no meHning ?::11 ~1,ucePt w,"hln the con text of diverse parties. The prnposilion thai 11 monolith is united is .......... ntta y 11 tauto ogy.
I~. wt.tLLtAM FI!u.NER, COMPETTnOI"l" AMONO TilE FEW 49 (1960) In modern economic theory, collective action. prisoner's dilemma a nd exte rnalities problems (among other issues) cha llenge the classical econo mic assumpt ion that individuals will always mak e ra tional choices to max imize their in terests. T he trouble is tha i there is a ;'divergence between ind ividual and collective rationality" as seen in collect ive act ion and prisoner's dile mma probl e m s.l~
For a long while, econo mists, like specialists in othe r fie lds, ofte n took it for granted that groups of individuals with common interests tended to act to further those commo n inte rests. much as individuals might be expected to furth er their own interests .... More recently. the explicit analysis of the logic of in dividual optimization in groups wilh common interests has led 10 a drama ti cally differen t view of collective action. no
This quandary is not simply speculative in nature, but a practical proble m that has been duly noted in Ihe debate surrounding th e goverrUl1cnt's need 10 mandate public interest television.
[Plublic interest programming can ~ro~u.ce social .ben e fit~ th.a~ will not be adequately captured by the mdlVlduaJ chOices of md lvldual citizens; the sa me is true for programming that produces social costs, including apathy, fear, and increased criminal activity. Because of the coUective action problem, an unregulated market wi ll underproduce public goods and overproduce publ ic bads.' 1!I! Applyi ng the a nalysis of collective action and exte rnalities proble ms, the e xpla na tion fo r governme nt's effo rt to regula.le info rma tion flow stems from the need to protect the demand for 1Is public goods (i.e .. it is in the public's interest to receive a uni fo rm message (rom broadcasters and publishers supporting policies and values approved by the Slate), rather than from a drop in price (in terms of loya lty) as is the case in Professor Price's " market for lo~a lti es" t~eo ry . Using contemporary termino logy, the Slate must preserve ItS share m th e " marke t for eyeba ll s."'~ A ssuming that the analysis e mployed in collective action and externalities problems is simpler, why is it not the better explan atory Iheory?
In addition, a fundamental assumption of neoclassical econo mics-:-the e ffectiveness oftmregulated individual choice to maximil.e utili tY -Is brought into question by collective aClion and exte rnalities problems. These problems and modes of analysis, through coincide nce or 186. Alllltol Rapoport. P,isOJltr's Dilemma. 1 NEW PALORAVE DIC110NA RY OF ECON. 973. 974 (1987. rev. 1991 No. tl
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otherwise, have been associated wilh Ihe "market fo r eye balls."I' III The explanation for di ?~upti o n in the ~larket ~or eyebal~s. as _a result of governmen t's inablitty to regulate. In fo rmatJo.n n~w , .. ls a.n n~~ted to a market failure as a result of the "dlspa rate rallona lity of rndlvldual and collective decisions (i.e., what is good for the group is not necessarily Ihe maximum choice for individual. th us reSUl ting in defections (rom the group).191 On the o t~e r ha.nd, in the '· m a.r~e t for loyalties': theory, as set for th in this paper With rcfere nce to elasllcilY, the explanation for ma rket disruption is not seen as a market fa ilu re, but as a result of an ine lastic demand curve. While it may seem that the superior Iheory must contemplate modern modes of analysis, such as the problem o( colJective action a nd externalities, neoclassical economics need not be hast ily cast aside. Neoclassical economists do qualify their assertions with reference to such considerations,'Yl In addition, these economists do nOI seem to be grea tly troubled by the challenge to rationality. which is one of their fundamenta l assumptions.
Economists have answe red this criticism [to tJ1C assumption of rationality] in a number of ways, first by pointing out that the requirement of ration ality in econom ics is actually a very low requirement Second, Gary Becker has argued that the demand and supply relationship can be gene rated by random behavior; hence people do not have LO be rational to fu lfill the basic postulates of economics. This argument by Becker was criticized in part by Israel Kirzner, but the basic point is generally accepted.
l9J
For neoclassical economists, ratio nality is reduced to postu la ting that " human's demand curves slope downward and that lhey will se lect the [Vol. 2001 preferred choice over the less prefer red.', l"" Hence, neocl assical eco nomics rema ins a respectable discipline.
T he crux of the matte r is whe the r an ext erna lities proble m should cause us to discard the " mar ket for loyaJ lies" theory, and more speci.fica lly. whethe r the theory is applicable to a nalysis of the impact of the I.nte rn et. While the problem of exte rnalities is readily apparent with respect to public inte rest te levision (without governme nt regu la tion, stations would decline to supply such programs in fav or of those that attract wider aud iences and, hence, advertising dol lars) , the siluation is markedly different with respect to the Intern et because conmlerci al advertising dollars a re not necessary to fund government Web sites a nd conte nt is not dicta ted by viewe r rati ngs. Adopting the ;' ma rke t for loyalties" analysis, it could be a rgued tha t exte rna lities exist with respect to the exchange of ident it y for loyalty, since a "socially be neficial" and unified message of identit y proj ected by the governme nt has many exte rn al beneficia ries. H oweve r. such an a rgument is inconsistent wit h the values of a plura listic society. which on the whole would fin d such an arrange ment to be d isadvant ageous. In summary, th e conditions creating an externa bties proble m for pubJjc interest television programming are not universally applicable and do not apply to the Inte rnet. Consequently, the re is no reason to discount " ma rke t for loya lt ies" theory or neoclassical economics as a useful tool for considering the impact of the Internet.
The real question is whether one theory is supe rior to the othe r beca use it is simpler or it explains more. As thoroughly discussed above. the " mark et for loya lties" theory ma kes predictions as to the degree of disrupti on ca used by government's fa ilure to regulate informa tion fl ow, de pending upon the degree to which competi ng ide ntities havc already established themselves within the market (i.e., the ex:tent of openness of the socie ty) . T he question is whe ther such predjctions can be made using the analysis employed in collective action and externalities problems.
Collective action analysis does ma ke predictions about whe n defections (resulting in a marke t fa ilu re a nd djsruption) will occur based on the size of me mbership in the group.
Essentially, as group membe rship grows, all oth er things being equa l, " the incentive to act collectively diminishes ." ' 9S This is beca use eventually " !.he fa ilure of one ll1dividua l to support collective action will nOl ... have any gerceptible effec t on the incentive any othe r individua l fa ces .... " \IIi Whil e providing useful insight , both the "marke t for loyalties" and th e " mark et fo r eyeba lls" theories contemplate vast marke ts (e.g. , tbe citizens of a state). The issue is not simply if there will be disruption a t the poillt when a go ve rnme nt can no longe r regulate in fo rma tion fl ow, but how differe nt s~cieties will fa re, dependi.ng upon the ir respective degrees of openness (I. e., the number of preVIOusly compe ting identities in th eir m?rket places): To this extent, the ';market (or loyalti es," as described in this pape r to mc~ude concepts of elasticity, provides us with a bell er theory because It explains more than the trad itional " market for eyeballs" theory.
IV. CONCLUS ION .
T he I~tern et. may prove to be particularly diffi cult to regulat e since ~ts n~t~re IS to Clrcunwem blockages in information flow . In spit e of l~e~t~la ble bo. un~aries provided by ISPs, which may be subject to habdl.ty b~ ~erntona l governments, the advent of mirror sites (especially at uruve rSllJes), alternate mean s of routi ng, a nd the sheer volume of the ~et> w~en coupled .with an inability to effectively filt er "objecti onable" s~tes (wll hout ?Io~~mg unoffen~jve, technica l, and economica lly val uable sl.tes), makes slgm flca nt regu lation of the Inte rnet uncertain at best. The d lle~ma has. bec?me how to ta ke economic advantage of wh at the Ne t provld:s,. ~vhl le sm~ultaneously screening undesirable information. The Im poss,.blh~y of domg so has become an instance of " having one 's cake and eatmg It too."
Pr?fess~r MOllfoe Price presents a " mark et fo r loyalties" econOmic ?",od~l III wlu: h .gove rnme nts and their constituent powe r holders trade Identity (eonslsling o.f the . dreams, hopes, and heritage of the ir cit izens) fo r the loya lty o f the,.r .subJects. Ln this mark et. gove rnmc nts a nd power holders a re se lJ~rs, clllzens are co nsumers, the curre ncy is loyalty and the p~oduct bemg pur.c~ased is. i~entity. Governme nts tradili o'na lly est~bhsh ~lO~opoly positions to hmlt c~mpet ing ide ntities, thus e nsuring a high pnce I.n te nus of loy~lt.y for thelf efforts. Ultimately, regUla tory change only o~c~rs when eXlstlllg regulatory limitations a re ineffective to protect th e e~lstmg power stTllcture, or whe n there has been a shift in that structure mvolvmg new members.
Th.is. pa,pe r has sought 10 brea k new ground by applying the "ma rket fo r loyalties theory to the [nle rne t under circumstan ces in which the re is a loss of m~nopoly control ove r the fl ow of informa ti on. Ge nera lly. !:rofessor Pnce only"applies his theory to monopolistic or oligopolistic . ma rke ts ~or ~oya lty, such as in inte rnational and sa te llite broadcasti ng ~n a uthofltan a n . stales: The " marke t for loyalties" theory (if it Ill corporates. co n S ld~r? lt O n of e lasticity, as it does in this pa per) is a potem tool III explammg the consequences of a state not being able to 'mpo~e monopoly control over information flow. Gove rnments, and their c? nshtuent power h?lders, ca ug~t oU guard by the Inte rne t's powe r to clr~u mve!lt ce n sors~l~ controls fi sk destabiliza tion whe n the loyalty that th~lr sU?Jects are wdllll&. to ex-pe nd is diminished by an increased supply of Identity from compe lmg e nte rprises and factions from poims all over the globe.
The potential effects on Chin a and Singapore, both of wbich regulate (althougb in significantly varying degrees) tbe fl ow of informa tion over the fnternet, if such regulation is unsuccessful, will deviate widely depending on the sbape and pitch of their respective supply and demand (or loyalty and identity) curves.
Arguably, Singapore's demand curve is elastic as a result of its developed and robust economy and the fact that it is more likely to have already experienced significant exposure to and participation in Western commercial cult ure.
In contrast, China is more susceptible to destabilization as the result of an arguably inelastic and steeper demand curve. Indeed, as proposed in this paper, the degree of instability caused by the advent of new sources of identity is an inverse function of the prior penet ration of competing identities, which fu nction can be expressed as fo llows:
where "i" is id entity, "k" represen ts the level of new competing identities being introduced, and "p" is the penetration of previously competing identities, or substitu tes, into the market. Further extrapolation of this theory reveals that the instability caused by each additional identity decreases with an increasing nwnber of competing identities in the market-a kind of mathematical justification for free speech, diversity, and tolerance.
The "market for loyalties" theory, if extended in its application as it is in this paper (including consideration of elasticit y), serves our changing information society well.
It gives us greater understanding and rudi mentary tools for predicting th e consequences of unimpeded information flow.
Conseq uently, application of the "market for loyalties" theory merits serious consideration for any interested pundit or self-proclaimed prophet of the information age. ,. 
